BRAY
v. ALEXANDRIA CLINIC, 506 U.S. 263 (1993)
January 13, 1993
506
U.S. 263
JAYNE
BRAY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S
HEALTH CLINIC ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT
No. 90-985
Argued October 16, 1991 Reargued October 6, 1992
Decided January 13, 1993
Respondents,
abortion clinics and supporting organizations, sued to enjoin
petitioners, an association and individuals who organize and
coordinate antiabortion demonstrations, from conducting demonstrations
at clinics in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. The
District Court held that, by conspiring to deprive women seeking
abortions of their right to interstate travel, petitioners
had violated the first clause of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), which
prohibits conspiracies to deprive, "any person or class
of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws"; ruled for
respondents on their pendent state law claims of trespass
and public nuisance; as relief on these three claims, enjoined
petitioners from trespassing on, or obstructing access to,
specified clinics; and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988, ordered
petitioners to pay respondents attorney's fees and costs on
the 1985(3) claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1.
The first clause of 1985(3) does not provide a federal cause
of action against persons obstructing access to abortion
clinics. Pp. 267-278.
(a)
Respondents have not shown that opposition to abortion qualifies
alongside race discrimination as an "otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus [underlying] the conspirators'
action," as is required under Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88, 102, in order to prove a private conspiracy
in violation of 1985(3)'s first clause. Respondents' claim
that petitioners' opposition to abortion reflects an animus
against women in general must be rejected. The "animus"
requirement demands at least a purpose that focuses upon
women by reason of their sex, whereas the record indicates
that petitioners' demonstrations are not directed specifically
at women, but are intended to protect the victims of abortion,
stop its practice, and reverse its legalization. Opposition
to abortion cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex-based
intent; there are common and respectable reasons for opposing
abortion other than a derogatory view of women as a class.
This Court's prior decisions indicate that the disfavoring
of abortion, although only women [506
U.S. 263, 264] engage in the activity, is not ipso facto
invidious discrimination against women as a class. Pp. 268-274.
(b)
Respondents have also not shown that petitioners "aimed
at interfering with rights" that are "protected
against private, as well as official, encroachment,"
a second prerequisite to proving a private conspiracy in
violation of 1985(3)'s first clause. Carpenters v. Scott,
463 U.S. 825, 833. Although the right to interstate travel
is constitutionally protected against private interference
in at least some contexts, Carpenters makes clear that a
1985(3) private conspiracy must be "aimed at"
that right. Ibid. That was not established here. Although
respondents showed that substantial numbers of women travel
interstate to reach the clinics in question, it was irrelevant
to petitioners' opposition whether or not such travel preceded
the intended abortions. Moreover, as far as appears from
the record, petitioners' proposed demonstrations would erect
"actual barriers to . . . movement" only intrastate.
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60, n. 6. Respondents have
conceded that this intrastate restriction is not applied
discriminatorily against interstate travelers, and the right
to interstate travel is therefore not implicated. Ibid.
Nor can respondents' 1985(3) claim be based on the right
to abortion, which is a right protected only against state
interference, and therefore cannot be the object of a purely
private conspiracy. See Carpenters, supra, at 833. Pp. 274-278.
(c)
The dissenters err in considering whether respondents have
established a violation of 1985(3)'s second, "hindrance"
clause, which covers conspiracies "for the purpose
of preventing or hindering . . . any State . . . from giving
or securing to all persons . . . the equal protection of
the laws." A "hindrance" clause claim was
not stated in the complaint, was not considered by either
of the lower courts, was not contained in the questions
presented on certiorari, and was not suggested by either
party as a question for argument or decision here. Nor is
it readily determinable that respondents have established
a "hindrance" clause violation. The language in
the first clause of 1985(3) that is the source of the Griffin
animus requirement also appears in the "hindrance"
clause. Second, respondents' "hindrance" "claim"
would fail unless the "hindrance" clause applies
to private conspiracies aimed at rights constitutionally
protected only against official encroachment. Cf. Carpenters.
Finally, the District Court did not find that petitioners'
purpose was to prevent or hinder law enforcement. Pp. 279-285.
2.
The award of attorney's fees and costs under 1988 must be
vacated because respondents were not entitled to relief
under 1985(3). However, respondents' 1985(3) claims were
not, prior to this decision, "wholly insubstantial
and frivolous," Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-683,
so as to deprive the District Court of subject-matter jurisdiction
[506 U.S. 263, 265] over the action. Consideration should be
given on remand to the question whether the District Court's
judgment on the state law claims alone can support the injunction
that was entered. P. 285.
914
F.2d 582, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
SCALIA,
J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST,
C.J., and WHITE, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. KENNEDY,
J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 287. SOUTER, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part, post, p. 288. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 307. O'CONNOR, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined,
post, p. 345.
Jay
Alan Sekulow reargued the cause for petitioners. With him
on the briefs were James M. Henderson, Sr., Douglas W. Davis,
Thomas Patrick Monaghan, Walter M. Weber, and James E. Murphy.
Deputy
Solicitor General Roberts reargued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson,
Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Barbara L. Herwig, and Lowell V. Sturgill,
Jr.
Deborah
A. Ellis reargued the ccause for respondents. With her on
the brief were Martha F. Davis, Sally F. Goldfarb, John H.
Schafer, and Laurence J. Eisenstein. John H. Schafer argued
the cause for respondents on the original argument. With him
on the brief were William H. Allen, Mr. Eisenstein, Alison
Wetherfield, and Helen Neuborne.*
[Footnote
*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for American
Victims of Abortion by James Bopp, Jr., and Richard E. Coleson;
for Concerned Women for America by Andrew J. Ekonomou and
Mark N. Troobnick; for Feminists for Life of America et al.
by Christine Smith Torre and Edward R. Grant; for the Free
Congress Foundation by Eric A. Daly and Jordan P. Secola,
and George J. Mercer; for the Southern Center for Law &
Ethics by Albert L. Jordan; for Woman Exploited by Abortion
et al. by Samuel Brown Casey, Victor L. Smith, and David L.
Llewellyn; for Daniel [506 U.S. 263, 266]
Berrigan et al. by Wendall R. Bird and David J. Myers; and
for James Joseph Lynch, Jr., pro se.
Briefs
of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Attorney
General of New York et al. by Robert Abrams, Attorney General
of New York, pro se, O. Peter Sherwood, Solicitor General,
Sanford M. Cohen and Shelley B. Mayer, Assistant Attorneys
General, and Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia,
pro se; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Judith
Levin, Steven R. Shapiro, John A. Powell, Burt Neuborne, and
Elliot M. Mincberg; for Falls Church, Virginia, by David R.
Lasso; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.,
by Julius L. Chambers, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Eric Schnapper;
for the National Abortion Federation et al. by Elaine Metlin,
Roger K. Evans, and Eve W. Paul; and for 20 Organizations
Committed to Women's Health and Women's Equality by Dawn Johnsen,
Lois Eisner Murphy, and Marcy J. Wilder.
Briefs
of amici curiae were filed for the National Right to Life
Committee, Inc., et al. by James Bopp, Jr., and Barry A. Bostrom;
and for George Lucas et al. by Lawrence J. Joyce and Craig
H. Greenwood. [506 U.S. 263, 266]
JUSTICE
SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
This
case presents the question whether the first clause of Rev.Stat.
1980, 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) - the surviving version of 2 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 - provides a federal cause of action
against persons obstructing access to abortion clinics. Respondents
are clinics that perform abortions and organizations that
support legalized abortion and that have members who may wish
to use abortion clinics. Petitioners are Operation Rescue,
an unincorporated association whose members oppose abortion,
and six individuals. Among its activities, Operation Rescue
organizes antiabortion demonstrations in which participants
trespass on, and obstruct general access to, the premises
of abortion clinics. The individual petitioners organize and
coordinate these demonstrations.
Respondents
sued to enjoin petitioners from conducting demonstrations
at abortion clinics in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan
area. Following an expedited trial, the District Court ruled
that petitioners had violated 1985(3) by [506
U.S. 263, 267] conspiring to deprive women seeking abortions
of their right to interstate travel. The court also ruled
for respondents on their pendent state law claims of trespass
and public nuisance. As relief on these three claims, the
court enjoined petitioners from trespassing on, or obstructing
access to, abortion clinics in specified Virginia counties
and cities in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. National
Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.Supp. 1483
(ED Va. 1989). Based on its 1985(3) ruling and pursuant to
42 U.S.C. 1988, the court also ordered petitioners to pay
respondents $27,687.55 in attorney's fees and costs.
The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, National
Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (1990),
and we granted certiorari, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991). The case
was argued in the October 1991 Term, and pursuant to our direction,
see 504 U.S. 970 (1992), was reargued in the current Term.
I
Our
precedents establish that, in order to prove a private conspiracy
in violation of the first clause of 1985(3),1
a [506 U.S. 263, 268] plaintiff must show,
inter alia, (1) that "some racial, or perhaps otherwise
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind
the conspirators' action," Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 102 (1971), and (2) that the conspiracy "aimed
at interfering with rights" that are "protected
against private, as well as official, encroachment,"
Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983). We think neither
showing has been made in the present case.
A
In
Griffin, this Court held, reversing a 20-year-old precedent,
see Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), that 1985(3)
reaches not only conspiracies under color of state law, but
also purely private conspiracies. In finding that the text
required that expanded scope, however, we recognized the "constitutional
shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting 1985(3)
as a general federal tort law." Griffin, 403 U.S., at
102. That was to be avoided, we said, "by requiring,
as an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously
discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the
limiting amendment," ibid. - citing specifically Representative
Shellabarger's statement that the law was restricted "to
the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality
of rights of American citizens; that any violation of the
right, the animus and effect of which is to strike down the
citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights
as contrasted with his and other citizens' rights, shall be
within the scope of the remedies. . . .," id., at 100
(emphasis in original), quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess., App. 478 (1871). We said that "[t]he language
[of 1985(3)] requiring intent to deprive of equal protection,
or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must
be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
[506 U.S. 263, 269] discriminatory animus
behind the conspirators' action." 403 U.S., at 102 (emphasis
in original).
We
have not yet had occasion to resolve the "perhaps";
only in Griffin itself have we addressed and upheld a claim
under 1985(3), and that case involved race discrimination.
Respondents assert that there qualifies alongside race discrimination,
as an "otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus" covered by the 1871 law, opposition to abortion.
Neither common sense nor our precedents support this.
To
begin with, we reject the apparent conclusion of the District
Court (which respondents make no effort to defend) that opposition
to abortion constitutes discrimination against the "class"
of "women seeking abortion." Whatever may be the
precise meaning of a "class" for purposes of Griffin's
speculative extension of 1985(3) beyond race, the term unquestionably
connotes something more than a group of individuals who share
a desire to engage in conduct that the 1985(3) defendant disfavors.
Otherwise, innumerable tort plaintiffs would be able to assert
causes of action under 1985(3) by simply defining the aggrieved
class as those seeking to engage in the activity the defendant
has interfered with. This definitional ploy would convert
the statute into the "general federal tort law"
it was the very purpose of the animus requirement to avoid.
Ibid. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN has cogently put it, the class "cannot
be defined simply as the group of victims of the tortious
action." Carpenters, supra, at 850 (dissenting opinion).
"Women seeking abortion" is not a qualifying class.
Respondents'
contention, however, is that the alleged class-based discrimination
is directed not at "women seeking abortion," but
at women in general. We find it unnecessary to decide whether
that is a qualifying class under 1985(3), since the claim
that petitioners' opposition to abortion reflects an animus
against women in general must be rejected. We do not think
that the "animus" requirement can be met [506
U.S. 263, 270] only by maliciously motivated, as opposed to
assertedly benign (though objectively invidious), discrimination
against women. It does demand, however, at least a purpose
that focuses upon women by reason of their sex - for example
(to use an illustration of assertedly benign discrimination),
the purpose of "saving" women because they are women
from a combative, aggressive profession such as the practice
of law. The record in this case does not indicate that petitioners'
demonstrations are motivated by a purpose (malevolent or benign)
directed specifically at women as a class; to the contrary,
the District Court found that petitioners define their "rescues"
not with reference to women, but as physical intervention
"`between abortionists and the innocent victims,'"
and that "all [petitioners] share a deep commitment to
the goals of stopping the practice of abortion and reversing
its legalization." 726 F.Supp., at 1488. Given this record,
respondents' contention that a class-based animus has been
established can be true only if one of two suggested propositions
is true: (1) that opposition to abortion can reasonably be
presumed to reflect a sex-based intent, or (2) that intent
is irrelevant, and a class-based animus can be determined
solely by effect. Neither proposition is supportable.
As
to the first: some activities may be such an irrational object
of disfavor that, if they are targeted, and if they also happen
to be engaged in exclusively or predominantly by a particular
class of people, an intent to disfavor that class can readily
be presumed. A tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.
But opposition to voluntary abortion cannot possibly be considered
such an irrational surrogate for opposition to (or paternalism
towards) women. Whatever one thinks of abortion, it cannot
be denied that there are common and respectable reasons for
opposing it, other than hatred of, or condescension toward
(or indeed any view at all concerning), women as a class -
as is evident from the fact that men and women are on both
sides of the issue, just as men and women are on both sides
of petitioners' unlawful demonstrations. [506
U.S. 263, 271] See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
Respondents'
case comes down, then, to the proposition that intent is legally
irrelevant; that, since voluntary abortion is an activity
engaged in only by women,2 to disfavor it
is ipso facto to discriminate invidiously against women as
a class. Our cases do not support that proposition. In Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), we rejected the claim that
a state disability insurance system that denied coverage to
certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy discriminated
on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. "While it is true,"
we said, "that only women can become pregnant, it does
not follow that every legislative classification concerning
pregnancy is a sex-based classification." Id., at 496,
n. 20. We reached a similar conclusion in Personnel Administrator
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), sustaining against
an Equal Protection Clause challenge a Massachusetts law giving
employment preference to military veterans, a class which,
in Massachusetts, was over 98% male, id., at 270. "`Discriminatory
purpose,'" we said, "implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It [506
U.S. 263, 272] implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
"because of," not merely "in spite of,"
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id.,
at 279 (citation omitted).3 The same principle
applies to the "class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus" requirement of 1985(3).4 Moreover,
two of our cases [506 U.S. 263, 273] deal
specifically with the disfavoring of abortion, and establish
conclusively that it is not ipso facto sex discrimination.
In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980), we held that the constitutional test
applicable to government abortion funding restrictions is
not the heightened scrutiny standard that our cases demand
for sex-based discrimination, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197-199 (1976), but the ordinary rationality standard.
See Maher, supra, at 470-471, 478; Harris, supra, at 322-324.
[506 U.S. 263, 274]
The
nature of the "invidiously discriminatory animus"
Griffin had in mind is suggested both by the language used
in that phrase ("invidious . . . [t]ending to excite
odium, ill will, or envy; likely to give offense; esp., unjustly
and irritatingly discriminating," Webster's Second International
Dictionary 1306 (1954)) and by the company in which the phrase
is found ("there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus," Griffin,
403 U.S., at 102 (emphasis added)). Whether one agrees or
disagrees with the goal of preventing abortion, that goal
in itself (apart from the use of unlawful means to achieve
it, which is not relevant to our discussion of animus) does
not remotely qualify for such harsh description, and for such
derogatory association with racism. To the contrary, we have
said that "a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion" is proper and reasonable enough to be implemented
by the allocation of public funds, see Maher, supra, at 474,
and Congress itself has, with our approval, discriminated
against abortion in its provision of financial support for
medical procedures, see Harris, supra, at 325. This is not
the stuff out of which a 1985(3) "invidiously discriminatory
animus" is created.
B
Respondents'
federal claim fails for a second, independent reason: A 1985(3)
private conspiracy "for the purpose of depriving . .
. any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws," requires an intent to deprive persons of a right
guaranteed against private impairment. See Carpenters, 463
U.S., at 833. No intent to deprive of such a right was established
here.
Respondents,
like the courts below, rely upon the right to interstate travel
- which we have held to be, in at least some contexts, a right
constitutionally protected against private interference. See
Griffin, supra, at 105-106. But all that respondents can point
to by way of connecting petitioners' [506
U.S. 263, 275] actions with that particular right is the District
Court's finding that "[s]ubstantial numbers of women
seeking the services of [abortion] clinics in the Washington
Metropolitan area travel interstate to reach the clinics."
726 F.Supp., at 1489. That is not enough. As we said in a
case involving 18 U.S.C. 241, the criminal counterpart of
1985(3):
"[A]
conspiracy to rob an interstate traveler would not, of itself,
violate 241. But if the predominant purpose of the conspiracy
is to impede or prevent the exercise of the right of interstate
travel, or to oppress a person because of his exercise of
that right, then . . . the conspiracy becomes a proper object
of the federal law under which the indictment in this case
was brought." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
760 (1966).5
Our
discussion in Carpenters makes clear that it does not suffice
for application of 1985(3) that a protected right be incidentally
affected. A conspiracy is not "for the purpose"
of denying equal protection simply because it has an effect
upon a protected right. The right must be "aimed at,"
463 U.S., at 833 (emphasis added); its impairment must be
a conscious objective of the enterprise. Just as the "invidiously
discriminatory animus" requirement, discussed above,
requires that the defendant have taken his action "at
least in part `because of,' not merely `in spite of,' its
adverse effects [506 U.S. 263, 276] upon
an identifiable group," Feeney, 442 U.S., at 279, so
also the "intent to deprive of a right" requirement
demands that the defendant do more than merely be aware of
a deprivation of right that he causes, and more than merely
accept it; he must act at least in part for the very purpose
of producing it.6 That was not shown to be
the case here, and is on its face implausible. Petitioners
oppose abortion, and it is irrelevant to their opposition
whether the abortion is performed after interstate travel.
Respondents
have failed to show a conspiracy to violate the right of interstate
travel for yet another reason: Petitioners' proposed demonstrations
would not implicate that right. The federal guarantee of interstate
travel does not transform state-law torts into federal offenses
when they are intentionally [506 U.S. 263,
277] committed against interstate travelers. Rather, it protects
interstate travelers against two sets of burdens: "the
erection of actual barriers to interstate movement" and
"being treated differently" from intrastate travelers.
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60, n. 6 (1982). See Paul
v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869) (Art. IV, 2, "inhibits
discriminating legislation against [citizens of other States
and] gives them the right of free ingress into other States,
and egress from them"); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
395 (1948) (Art. IV, 2, "insure[s] to a citizen of State
A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the
citizens of State B enjoy"). As far as appears from this
record, the only "actual barriers to. . . movement"
that would have resulted from petitioners' proposed demonstrations
would have been in the immediate vicinity of the abortion
clinics, restricting movement from one portion of the Commonwealth
of Virginia to another. Such a purely intrastate restriction
does not implicate the right of interstate travel, even if
it is applied intentionally against travelers from other States,
unless it is applied discriminatorily against them. That would
not be the case here, as respondents conceded at oral argument.7
The
other right alleged by respondents to have been intentionally
infringed is the right to abortion. The District Court declined
to rule on this contention, relying exclusively upon the right-of-interstate-travel
theory; in our view, it also [506 U.S. 263,
278] is an inadequate basis for respondents' 1985(3) claim.
Whereas, unlike the right of interstate travel, the asserted
right to abortion was assuredly "aimed at" by the
petitioners, deprivation of that federal right (whatever its
contours) cannot be the object of a purely private conspiracy.
In Carpenters, we rejected a claim that an alleged private
conspiracy to infringe First Amendment rights violated 1985(3).
The statute does not apply, we said, to private conspiracies
that are "aimed at a right that is by definition a right
only against state interference," but applies only to
such conspiracies as are "aimed at interfering with rights
. . . protected against private, as well as official, encroachment."
463 U.S., at 833. There are few such rights (we have hitherto
recognized only the Thirteenth Amendment right to be free
from involuntary servitude, United States v. Kozminski, 487
U.S. 931, 942 (1988), and, in the same Thirteenth Amendment
context, the right of interstate travel, see United States
v. Guest, supra, at 759, n. 17). The right to abortion is
not among them. It would be most peculiar to accord it that
preferred position, since it is much less explicitly protected
by the Constitution than, for example, the right of free speech
rejected for such status in Carpenters. Moreover, the right
to abortion has been described in our opinions as one element
of a more general right of privacy, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152-153 (1973), or of Fourteenth Amendment liberty, see
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S., at 846-851,
and the other elements of those more general rights are obviously
not protected against private infringement. (A burglar does
not violate the Fourth Amendment, for example, nor does a
mugger violate the Fourteenth.) Respondents' 1985(3) "deprivation"
claim must fail, then, because they have identified no right
protected against private action that has been the object
of the alleged conspiracy. [506 U.S. 263,
279]
II
Two
of the dissenters claim that respondents have established
a violation of the second, "hindrance" clause of
1985(3), which covers conspiracies "for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any
State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons
within such State or Territory the equal protection of the
laws." 42 U.S.C. 1985(3).
This
"claim" could hardly be presented in a posture less
suitable for our review. As respondents frankly admitted at
both argument and reargument, their complaint did not set
forth a claim under the "hindrance" clause. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 27 ("the complaint did not make a hinder
or prevent claim"); Tr. of Reargument 33-34.8
Not surprisingly, therefore, neither the District Court nor
the Court of Appeals considered the application of that clause
to the current facts. The "hindrance" clause issue
is not fairly included within the questions on which petitioners
sought certiorari, see Pet. for Cert. i; this Court's Rule
14.1(a),9 which is alone enough to exclude
it from our consideration.10 Nor is it true
[506 U.S. 263, 280] that "[t]he issue
was briefed, albeit sparingly, by the parties prior to the
first oral argument in this case." Post, at 3 (SOUTER,
J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
To the contrary, neither party initiated even the slightest
suggestion that the "hindrance" question was an
issue to be argued and decided here.11 That
possibility was suggested for the first time by questions
from the bench during argument, and was reintroduced, again
from the bench, during reargument. (Respondents sought to
include a "hindrance"-clause section in their Supplemental
Brief on Reargument, but the Court declined to accept that
section for filing. See 505 U.S. 1240 (1992).) In sum, the
Justices reaching the "hindrance"-clause issue in
this case must find in the complaint claims that the respondents
themselves have admitted are not there; must resolve a question
not presented to, or ruled on by, any lower court; must revise
the rule that it is the petition for certiorari (not the brief
in opposition and later briefs) that determines the questions
presented; and must penalize the parties for not addressing
an issue on [506 U.S. 263, 281] which the
Court specifically denied supplemental briefing.12 That is extraordinary. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 381-382, n. 3 (1992) (citing cases and treatises); Kamen
v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 97, n. 4
(1991); Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 277, and n. 23 (1989).
The
dissenters' zeal to reach the question whether there was a
"hindrance"-clause violation would be more understandable,
perhaps, if the affirmative answer they provided were an easy
one. It is far from that. Judging from the statutory text,
a cause of action under the "hindrance" clause would
seem to require the same "class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus" that the "deprivation" clause requires,
and that we have found lacking here. We said in Griffin that
the source of the animus requirement is "[t]he language
requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal
privileges and immunities," 403 U.S., at 102 (emphasis
in original) - and such language appears in the "hindrance"
clause as well.13 At oral argument, respondents
conceded applicability of the animus requirement, though they
withdrew [506 U.S. 263, 282] this concession on reargument. Without a race-
or class-based animus requirement, the "hindrance"
clause of this post-Civil War statute would have been an available
weapon against the mass "sit-ins" that were conducted
for purposes of promoting desegregation in the 1960's - a
wildly improbable result.14
Even,
moreover, if the "hindrance"-clause claim did not
fail for lack of class-based animus, it would still fail unless
the "hindrance" clause applies to a private conspiracy
aimed at [506 U.S. 263, 283] rights that
are constitutionally protected only against official (as opposed
to private) encroachment. JUSTICE STEVENS finds it "clear"
that it does, see post, at 34, citing, surprisingly, Carpenters.
To the extent that case illuminates this question at all,
it is clearly contrary to the dissent's view, holding that
the "deprivation" clause, at least, does not cover
private conspiracies aimed at rights protected only against
state encroachment. JUSTICE O'CONNOR simply asserts without
analysis that the "hindrance" clause nonetheless
applies to those rights, post, at 355-356 - although the operative
language of the two clauses ("equal protection of the
laws") is identical. JUSTICE SOUTER disposes of the rights-guaranteed-against-private-encroachment
requirement, and the class-based animus requirement as well,
only by (1) undertaking a full-dress reconsideration of Griffin
and Carpenters, (2) concluding that both those cases were
wrongly decided, and (3) limiting the damage of those supposed
errors by embracing an interpretation of the statute that
concededly gives the same language in two successive clauses
completely different meaning.15 See post, at 292-303. This [506 U.S. 263, 284] formidable task has been undertaken and completed,
we reiterate, uninvited by party or amicus, and with respect
to a cause of action not presented in the pleadings, not asserted
or ruled upon below, and not contained in the questions presented
on certiorari.
Equally
troubling as the dissenters' questionable resolution of a
legal issue never presented is their conclusion that the lower
court found (or, in the case of JUSTICE SOUTER, can reasonably
be thought to have found) the facts necessary to support the
(nonexistent) "hindrance" claim. They concede that
this requires a finding that the protesters' purpose was to
prevent or hinder law enforcement officers; but discern such
a finding in the District Court's footnote recitation that
"the rescuers outnumbered the . . . police officers"
and that "the police were unable to prevent the closing
of the clinic for more than six (6) hours." National
Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.Supp., at
1489, n. 4. See post, at 339 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); post,
at 356 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting); post, at 306 (SOUTER, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). This
renders the distinction between "purpose" and "effect"
utterly meaningless. Here again, the dissenters (other than
JUSTICE SOUTER) would give respondents more than respondents
themselves dared to ask. Respondents frankly admitted at the
[506 U.S. 263, 285] original argument, and
even at reargument, that the District Court never concluded
that impeding law enforcement was the purpose of petitioners'
protests, and that the "hindrance" claim, if valid
in law, required a remand. They were obviously correct.16
III
Because
respondents were not entitled to relief under 1985(3), they
were also not entitled to attorney's fees and costs under
42 U.S.C. 1988. We therefore vacate that award.
Petitioners
seek even more. They contend that respondents' 1985(3) claims
were so insubstantial that the District Court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the action, including the pendent state
claims, and that the injunction should therefore be vacated
and the entire action dismissed. We do not agree. While respondents'
1985(3) causes of action fail, they were not, prior to our
deciding of this case, "wholly insubstantial and frivolous,"
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-683 (1946), so as to deprive
the District Court of jurisdiction.
It
may be, of course, that even though the District Court had
jurisdiction over the state-law claims, judgment on those
claims alone cannot support the injunction that was entered.
We leave that question for consideration on remand. [506
U.S. 263, 286]
JUSTICE
STEVENS' dissent observes that this is "a case about
the exercise of federal power to control an interstate conspiracy
to commit illegal acts," post, at 344, and involves "no
ordinary trespass," or "picketing of a local retailer,"
but "the kind of zealous, politically motivated, lawless
conduct that led to the enactment of the Ku Klux Act in 1871
and gave it its name," post, at 313. Those are certainly
evocative assertions, but, as far as the point of law we have
been asked to decide is concerned, they are irrelevant. We
construe the statute, not the views of "most members
of the citizenry." Post, at 344. By its terms, 1985(3)
covers concerted action by as few as two persons, and does
not require even interstate (much less nationwide) scope.
It applies no more and no less to completely local action
by two part-time protesters than to nationwide action by a
full-time force of thousands.17 And, under
our precedents, it simply does not apply to the sort of action
at issue here.
Trespassing
upon private property is unlawful in all States, as is, in
many States and localities, intentionally obstructing the
entrance to private premises. These offenses may be prosecuted
criminally under state law, and may also be the basis for
state civil damages. They do not, however, give rise to a
federal cause of action simply because their objective is
to prevent the performance of abortions, any more than they
do so (as we have held) when their objective is to stifle
free speech. [506 U.S. 263, 287]
The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and vacated
in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It
is so ordered
Footnotes
[Footnote
1] Section 1985(3) provides as follows:
"If
two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or
go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another,
for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the
constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving
or securing to all persons within such State or Territory
the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons
conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any
citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his
support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor
of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector
for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress
of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person
or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any
case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or
more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any
act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby
another is injured in his person or property, or deprived
of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen
of the [506 U.S. 263, 268] United States,
the party so injured or deprived may have an action for
the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation,
against any one or more of the conspirators." 42 U.S.C.
1985(3).
[Footnote
2] Petitioners and their amici argue that the intentional
destruction of human fetuses, which is the target of their
protests, is engaged in not merely by the women who seek and
receive abortions, but by the medical and support personnel
who provide abortions, and even by the friends and relatives
who escort the women to and from the clinics. Many of those
in the latter categories, petitioners point out, are men,
and petitioners block their entry to the clinics no less than
the entry of pregnant women. Respondents reply that the essential
object of petitioners' conspiracy is to prevent women from
intentionally aborting their fetuses. The fact that the physical
obstruction targets some men, they say, does not render it
any less "class based" against women - just as a
racial conspiracy against blacks does not lose that character
when it targets in addition white supporters of black rights,
see Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983). We need
not resolve this dispute, but assume for the sake of argument
that respondents' characterization is correct.
[Footnote
3] JUSTICE STEVENS asserts that, irrespective of intent or
motivation, a classification is sex-based if it has a sexually
discriminatory effect. Post, at 326-332. The cases he puts
forward to confirm this revisionist reading of Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), in fact confirm the opposite.
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), cited Geduldig
only once, in endorsement of Geduldig's ruling that a facially
neutral benefit plan is not sex-based unless it is shown that
"distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed
to effect an invidious discrimination against the members
of one sex or the other." 434 U.S., at 145 (quoting Geduldig,
supra, at 496-497, n. 20) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Satty said that the Court "need not decide" whether
"it is necessary to prove intent to establish a prima
facie violation of 703(a)(1)," 434 U.S., at 144, because
"[r]espondent failed to prove even a discriminatory effect,"
id., at 145 (emphasis added). It is clear from this that sex-based
discriminatory intent is something beyond sexually discriminatory
effect. The Court found liability in Satty "[n]otwithstanding
Geduldig," post, at 328, not (as JUSTICE STEVENS suggests)
because Geduldig is compatible with the belief that effects
alone constitute the requisite intent, but rather because
703(a)(2) of Title VII has no intent requirement. 434 U.S.,
at 139-141. In his discussion of the (inapplicable) Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 92 Stat. 2076, JUSTICE STEVENS acknowledges
that Congress understood Geduldig as we do, see post, at 330-331,
and nn. 29-30. As for the cases JUSTICE STEVENS relegates
to footnotes: Turner v. Utah Dept. of Employment Security,
423 U.S. 44 (1975), was not even a discrimination case; General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976), describes
the holding of Geduldig precisely as we do; and Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983),
casts no doubt on the continuing vitality of Geduldig.
[Footnote
4] We think this principle applicable to 1985(3) not because
we believe that Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence is automatically
incorporated into 1985(3), but rather because it is inherent
in the requirement of a class-based animus, i.e., an animus
based on class. We do not dispute JUSTICE STEVENS' observation,
post, at 326, that Congress "may offer relief from discriminatory
effects," without evidence of intent. The question is
[506 U.S. 263, 273] whether it has done
so, and if we are faithful to our precedents, we must conclude
that it has not.
JUSTICE
STEVENS and JUSTICE O'CONNOR would replace discriminatory
purpose with a requirement of intentionally class-specific
(or perhaps merely disparate) impact. Post, at 322-332 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting); post, at 350-354 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting).
It is enough for these dissenters that members of a protected
class are "targeted" for unlawful action "by
virtue of their class characteristics," post, at 352
(O'CONNOR, J., dissenting), see also post, at 354, regardless
of what the motivation or animus underlying that unlawful
action might be. Accord, post, at 322-323 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
This approach completely eradicates the distinction, apparent
in the statute itself, between purpose and effect. Under JUSTICE
STEVENS' approach, petitioners' admitted purpose of preserving
fetal life (a "legitimate and nondiscriminatory goal,"
post, at 323 (emphasis added)) becomes the "indirect
consequence of petitioners' blockade," while the discriminatory
effect on women seeking abortions is now "the conspirators'
immediate purpose," ibid. (emphasis added). JUSTICE O'CONNOR
acknowledges that petitioners' "target[ing]" is
motivated by "opposition to the practice of abortion."
Post, at 351.
In
any event, the characteristic that formed the basis of the
targeting here was not womanhood, but the seeking of abortion
- so that the class the dissenters identify is the one we
have rejected earlier: women seeking abortion. The approach
of equating opposition to an activity (abortion) that can
be engaged in only by a certain class (women) with opposition
to that class leads to absurd conclusions. On that analysis,
men and women who regard rape with revulsion harbor an invidious
antimale animus. Thus, if state law should provide that convicted
rapists must be paroled so long as they attend weekly counseling
sessions; and if persons opposed to such lenient treatment
should demonstrate their opposition by impeding access to
the counseling centers; those protesters would, on the dissenters'
approach, be liable under 1985(3) because of their antimale
animus.
[Footnote
5] JUSTICE STEVENS finds "most significant . . . the
dramatic difference between the language of 18 U.S.C. 241"
and that of 1985(3), in that the former "includes an
unequivocal `intent' requirement." Post, at 335. He has
it precisely backwards. The second paragraph of 241 does contain
an explicit "intent" requirement, but the first
paragraph, which was the only one at issue in Guest, see 383
U.S., at 747, does not; whereas 1985(3) does explicitly require
a "purpose." As for JUSTICE STEVENS' emphasis upon
the fact that 1985(3), unlike 241, embraces "a purpose
to deprive another of a protected privilege `either directly
or indirectly,'" post, at 335: that in no way contradicts
a specific intent requirement. The phrase "either directly
or indirectly" modifies "depriving," not "purpose."
The deprivation, whether direct or indirect, must still have
been the purpose of the defendant's action.
[Footnote
6] To contradict the plain import of our cases on this point,
JUSTICE STEVENS presses into service a footnote in Griffin.
Post, at 335-336, n. 33. In addressing "[t]he motivation
requirement introduced by the word `equal' into . . . 1985(3),"
Griffin said that this was not to be confused with a test
of "specific intent to deprive a person of a federal
right made definite by decision or other rule of law";
1985(3) "`contains no specific requirement of "wilfulness,'"
and its "motivation aspect . . . focuses not on scienter
in relation to deprivation of rights, but on invidiously discriminatory
animus." Griffin, 403 U.S., at 102, n. 10. This is supremely
irrelevant to the present discussion, since (1) we are not
considering "the motivation requirement introduced by
the word `equal,'" but rather the intent requirement
introduced by the word "purpose," and (2) we are
not asserting that the right in question must have been "made
definite by decision or other rule of law," but only
that it must have been "aimed at," with or without
knowledge that it is a federally protected right, cf. Screws
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103-107 (1945) - a requirement
not of "wilfulness," in other words, but only of
"purpose." The requisite "purpose" was
of course pleaded in Griffin as we specifically noted. See
403 U.S., at 103. JUSTICE STEVENS makes no response whatever
to the plain language of Carpenters, except to contend that
the same irrelevant footnote 10 reaches forward 12 years in
time, to prevent Carpenters from meaning what it obviously
says ("aimed at"). Although a few lower courts at
one time read the Griffin footnote as JUSTICE STEVENS does,
see post, at 336-337, those cases were all decided years before
this Court's opinion in Carpenters, which we follow.
[Footnote
7] JUSTICE STEVENS expresses incredulity at the rule we have
described. It is, he says, "unsupported by precedent
or reason," post, at 333, both of which show he claims,
that the right of interstate travel is violated even by "conduct
that evenhandedly disrupts both local and interstate travel,"
post, at 337. We cite right-to-travel cases for our position;
he cites nothing but negative Commerce Clause cases for his.
While it is always pleasant to greet such old Commerce Clause
warhorses as Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970),
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), and Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945),
cited post, at 337, surely they are irrelevant to the individual
right of interstate travel we are here discussing. That right
does not derive from the negative Commerce Clause, or else
it could be eliminated by Congress.
[Footnote
8] These admissions were accurate. The amended complaint alleged,
in its two federal causes of action, that petitioners "have
conspired to deprive women of their right to travel"
and "have conspired . . . for the purpose of denying
women seeking abortions . . . their rights to privacy."
App. 15-16. These are both "deprivation" claims;
neither one makes any allusion to hindrance or prevention
of state authorities.
[Footnote
9] JUSTICE SOUTER contends, post, at 290-291, that the "hindrance"
clause issue was embraced within question four, which asked:
"Are respondents' claims under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) so insubstantial
as to deprive the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction?"
Pet. for Cert. i. This argument founders on the hard (and
admitted) reality that "respondents' claims" did
not include a "hindrance" claim.
[Footnote
10] Contrary to JUSTICE SOUTER's suggestion, post, at 290-291,
the provision of our Rules giving respondents the right in
their brief in opposition, to restate the questions presented
Rule 24.2, does not give them the power to expand the questions
presented, as the Rule itself makes clear. In any event, neither
of the questions set forth in the Brief in Opposition fairly
[506 U.S. 263, 280] raises the "hindrance"
claim. And there is no support whatever for JUSTICE SOUTER's
reliance upon the formulation of the question in respondents'
brief on the merits, post, at 290, as the basis for deeming
the question properly presented - though on the merits, once
again, the question referred to by JUSTICE SOUTER is unhelpful.
[Footnote
11] Respondents' brief asserted that, if the Court did not
affirm the judgment on the basis of the "deprivation"
clause, then a remand would be necessary, so that respondents
could "present a number of contentions respecting [their
right-to-privacy] claim" which had not been reached below,
including the contention that" petitioners, by means
of their blockades, had hindered the police in securing to
women their right to privacy." Brief for Respondents
43. Petitioners' reply brief responded that the complaint
did not contain such a "hindrance" claim, and that
there was "no reason to believe" that the "hindrance"
clause "would not entail the same statutory requirements
of animus and independent rights which respondents have failed
to satisfy under the first clause of the statute." Reply
Brief for Petitioners 14-15. These were obviously not arguments
for resolution of the "hindrance" claim here.
[Footnote
12] We are unable to grasp the logic whereby JUSTICE SOUTER,
who would have us conclusively resolve the "hindrance"
clause legal issue against petitioners (despite their lack
of opportunity to address it both here and below) criticizes
our opinion, see post, at 291-292, for merely suggesting (without
resolving the "hindrance" clause issue) the difficulties
that inhere in his approach.
[Footnote
13] In straining to argue that the "hindrance" clause
does not have the same animus requirement as the first clause
of 1985(3), JUSTICE STEVENS makes an argument extrapolating
from the reasoning of Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983),
which held that the animus requirement expounded in Griffin
did not apply to a claim under the first clause of 1985(2).
Post, at 340-342. But the heart of Kush - what the case itself
considered "of greatest importance" - was the fact
that Griffin's animus requirement rested on "the `equal
protection' language" of 1985(3), which the first clause
of 1985(2) did not contain. 460 U.S., at 726. Since the "hindrance"
clause of 1985(3) does contain that language, the straightforward
application of Kush to this case is quite the opposite of
what JUSTICE STEVENS asserts.
[Footnote
14] JUSTICE SOUTER contends the sit-in example is inapposite,
because the sit-ins did not "depriv[e] the owners of
the segregated lunch counter[s] of any independently protected
constitutional right." Post, at 305, n. 10. In the very
paragraph to which that footnote is appended, however, JUSTICE
SOUTER purports to leave open the question whether the "hindrance"
clause would apply when the conspiracy "amount[s] to
a denial of police protection to individuals who are not attempting
to exercise a constitutional right," post, at 304, n.
9 - such as (presumably) the rights guaranteed by state trespass
laws. Certainly the sit-ins violated such state law rights,
or else there would have been no convictions. It is not true,
in any case, that the sit-ins did not invade constitutional
rights, if one uses that term (as JUSTICE SOUTER does) to
include rights constitutionally protected only against official
(as opposed to private) encroachment. Surely property owners
have a constitutional right not to have government physically
occupy their property without due process and without just
compensation.
JUSTICE
SOUTER's citation of Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609 (1984), post, at 305, n. 10, and Lane v. Cotton,
12 Mod. 472 (K.B. 1701), post, at 305, n. 10, requires no
response. He cites Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), for the proposition that the
1964 Civil Rights Act's elimination of restaurant owners'
right to exclude blacks from their establishments did not
violate the Due Process or Takings Clauses. Assuredly not.
But government regulation of commercial use through valid
legislation is hardly comparable to government action that
would have been the equivalent of what those conducting the
sit-ins did: physically occupy private property, against the
consent of the owner, without legal warrant. JUSTICE SOUTER
cites Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), post, at 306,
n. 10, to establish (in effect) that there was, even before
the Civil Rights Act, legal warrant for the physical occupation.
Any argument driven to reliance upon an extension of that
volatile case is obviously in serious trouble.
[Footnote
15] JUSTICE SOUTER contends that, even without the animus
and rights-guaranteed-against-private-encroachment requirements,
the "hindrance" clause will still be "significantly
limit[ed]" in scope, covering only "conspiracies
to act with enough force . . . to overwhelm the capacity of
legal authority to act evenhandedly in administering the law,"
post, at 300 (emphasis added). JUSTICE STEVENS discerns a
similar limitation, see post, 341-342. Only JUSTICE SOUTER
attempts to find a statutory basis for it. He argues that,
since 1985(1) prohibits a conspiracy to prevent "any
person" (emphasis added) from "discharging any duties,"
1985(3)'s prohibition of a conspiracy directed against "the
constituted authorities" (emphasis added) must be speaking
of something that affects more than a single official, post,
at 300. This seems to us a complete non sequitur. The difference
between "any person" and "constituted authorities"
would contain such a significant limitation (if at all) only
if the remaining language of the two sections was roughly
parallel. But it is not. Section 1985(1), for example, speaks
of categorically "prevent[ing]" a person's exercise
of his duties, whereas 1985(3) speaks of "preventing
or hindering" the constituted authorities. (Emphasis
added.) Obviously, one can "hinder" the [506
U.S. 263, 284] authorities by "preventing" an individual
officer. If these dissenters' interpretation of 1985(3) were
adopted, conspiracies to prevent individual state officers
from acting would be left entirely uncovered. (Section 1985(1)
applies only to officers of the United States - which is,
of course, the basic distinction between the two provisions.)
Neither
dissent explains why the application of enough force to impede
law enforcement, though not to "overwhelm" or "supplant"
it, does not constitute a "hindering"; or, indeed,
why only "force," and not bribery or misdirection,
must be the means of hindrance or prevention. Nothing in the
text justifies these limitations. JUSTICE SOUTER's faith in
the "severely limited" character of the hindrance
clause also depends upon his taking no position on whether
the clause protects federal statutory rights and state-protected
rights, post, at 303-304, n. 9.
[Footnote
16] Because of our disposition of this case, we need not address
whether the District Court erred by issuing an injunction,
despite the language in 1985(3) authorizing only "an
action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury
or deprivation." It is curious, however, that the dissenters,
though quick to reach and resolve the unpresented "hindrance"
issue, assume without analysis the propriety of the injunctive
relief that they approve - though the contrary was asserted
by the United States as amicus in support of petitioners,
and the issue was addressed by both parties in supplemental
briefs on reargument. See Supplemental Brief for Petitioners
on Reargument 4-9; Brief for Respondents on Reargument 9.
[Footnote
17] JUSTICE STEVENS chides us for invoking text here, whereas
(he says) we rely instead upon "statutory purpose"
for our class-based animus requirement - "selectively
employ[ing] both approaches to give [ 1985(3)] its narrowest
possible construction." Post, at 343, n. 37. That is
not so. For our class-based animus requirement we rely, plainly
and simply, upon our holding in Griffin, whatever approach
Griffin may have used. That holding is (though JUSTICE STEVENS
might wish otherwise) an integral part of our jurisprudence
extending 1985(3) to purely private conspiracies.
JUSTICE
KENNEDY, concurring.
In
joining the opinion of the Court, I make these added observations.
The
three separate dissenting opinions in this case offer differing
interpretations of the statute in question, 42 U.S.C. 1985(3).
Given the difficulty of the question, this is understandable,
but the dissenters' inability to agree on a single rationale
confirms, in my view, the correctness of the Court's opinion.
As all recognize, essential considerations of federalism are
at stake here. The federal balance is a fragile one, and a
false step in interpreting 1985(3) risks making a whole catalog
of ordinary state crimes a concurrent violation of a single
congressional statute passed more than a century ago.
Of
course, the wholesale commission of common state-law crimes
creates dangers that are far from ordinary. Even in the context
of political protest, persistent, organized, premeditated
lawlessness menaces in a unique way the capacity of a State
to maintain order and preserve the rights of its citizens.
Such actions are designed to inflame, not inform. They subvert
the civility and mutual respect that are the essential preconditions
for the orderly resolution of social conflict in a free society.
For this reason, it is important to note that another federal
statute offers the possibility of powerful federal assistance
for persons who are injured or threatened by organized lawless
conduct that falls within the primary jurisdiction of the
States and their local governments.
Should
state officials deem it necessary, law enforcement assistance
is authorized upon request by the State to the Attorney General
of the United States, pursuant to [506 U.S.
263, 288] 42 U.S.C. 10501. In the event of a law enforcement
emergency as to which "State and local resources are
inadequate to protect the lives and property of citizens or
to enforce the criminal law," 10502(3), the Attorney
General is empowered to put the full range of federal law
enforcement resources at the disposal of the State, including
the resources of the United States Marshals Service, which
was presumably the principal practical advantage to respondents
of seeking a federal injunction under 1985(3). See 10502(2).
If
this scheme were to be invoked, the nature and extent of a
federal response would be a determination for the Executive.
Its authority to act is less circumscribed than our own, but
I have little doubt that such extraordinary intervention into
local controversies would be ordered only after a careful
assessment of the circumstances, including the need to preserve
our essential liberties and traditions. Indeed, the statute
itself explicitly directs the Attorney General to consider
"the need to avoid unnecessary Federal involvement and
intervention in matters primarily of State and local concern."
10501(c)(5).
I
do not suggest that this statute is the only remedy available.
It does illustrate, however, that Congress has provided a
federal mechanism for ensuring that adequate law enforcement
resources are available to protect federally guaranteed rights,
and that Congress, too, attaches great significance to the
federal decision to intervene. Thus, even if, after proceedings
on remand, the ultimate result is dismissal of the action,
local authorities retain the right and the ability to request
federal assistance, should they deem it warranted.
JUSTICE
SOUTER, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part.
I
This
case turns on the meaning of two clauses of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3)
which render certain conspiracies civilly actionable. The
first clause (the deprivation clause) covers conspiracies
[506 U.S. 263, 289]
"for
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws";
the
second (the prevention clause), conspiracies
"for
the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities
of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all
persons within such State or Territory the equal protection
of the laws. . . ."
For
liability in either instance, the statute requires an "act
in furtherance of the . . . conspiracy, whereby [a person]
is injured in his person or property, or deprived of . . .
any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
. . ."
Prior
cases giving the words "equal protection of the laws"
in the deprivation clause an authoritative construction have
limited liability under that clause by imposing two conditions
not found in the terms of the text. An actionable conspiracy
must have some racial or perhaps other class-based motivation,
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971), and, if
it is "aimed at" the deprivation of a constitutional
right, the right must be one secured not only against official
infringement, but against private action as well, Carpenters
v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983). The Court follows these
cases in applying the deprivation clause today, and to this
extent I take no exception to its conclusion. I know of no
reason that would exempt us from the counsel of stare decisis
in adhering to this settled statutory construction, see Hilton
v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197 (1991),
which Congress is free to change if it should think our prior
reading unsound.
II
The
meaning of the prevention clause is not thus settled, however,
and starting in Part IV I will give my reasons for reading
it without any importation of these extratextual conditions
from the deprivation clause. First, however, a word [506
U.S. 263, 290] is in order to show that the prevention clause's
construction is properly before us, and to explain why the
Court is not in a position to cast doubt on that clause's
arguable applicability to the facts indicated by the record,
in light of the Court's refusal to allow respondents to address
this very issue in the supplemental briefing that was otherwise
permitted prior to the reargument of this case.
A
Respondents'
complaint does not limit their theory of liability to the
deprivation clause alone, for it alleges simply that petitioners
"have conspired with each other and other parties presently
unknown for the purpose of denying women seeking abortions
at targeted facilities their right to privacy, in violation
of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3)." App. 16.1 Evidence
presented at a hearing before the District Court addressed
the issue of prevention or hindrance, leading that court to
note that the demonstrators so far outnumbered local police
that "[e]ven though 240 rescuers were arrested the, police
were unable to prevent the closing of the clinic for more
than six (6) hours." National Organization for Women
v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.Supp. 1483, 1489, n. 4 (ED Va.
1989). The applicability of the prevention clause is fairly
included within the questions presented, especially as restated
by respondents, see Brief for Respondents i (first question
presented);2 Brief in Opposition i; Holmes
v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267,
n. 12 (1992) (respondent has the right under this Court's
Rule 24.2 to [506 U.S. 263, 291] restate
the questions presented); see also Pet. for Cert. i (petitioners'
fourth question presented).3 The issue
was briefed, albeit sparingly, by the parties prior to the
first oral argument in this case, see Brief for Respondents
43-44; Reply Brief for Petitioners 14-15, and during that
argument was the subject of a question from the bench. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29.
B
Just
as it is therefore proper for me to address the interpretation
of the prevention clause and the merits of respondents' position
under its terms, it was reasonable for respondents themselves
to seek leave to file a supplemental brief addressing that
interpretation and those merits prior to the reargument. Their
request was nonetheless denied, see 505 U.S. 1240 (1992),
though I voted to grant it, and three other Members of the
Court dissented on the record from the Court's action to the
contrary. Nonetheless, whatever may have been the better decision,
denying respondents' request was at least consistent with
leaving the consideration of the prevention clause for another
day, and in no way barred respondents from pressing a claim
under the clause at a later stage of this litigation. A vote
to deny the request could, for example, simply have reflected
a view that, in the absence of more extensive trial court
findings than those quoted above, it was better to leave the
prevention clause for further consideration on the remand
that I agree is appropriate. Now, however, in expressing skepticism
that the prevention clause could be a basis for relief, the
Court begins to close the door that the earlier order left
open, a move that is unfair to respondents after their request
was denied. While the Court's opinion concentrates on the
errors of my ways, it would be difficult not to read it as
rejecting a construction of the prevention clause under which
petitioners might [506 U.S. 263, 292] succeed,
and to that extent as barring their claim under a statutory
provision on which they were not allowed to comment in the
supplemental briefing that was otherwise permitted before
reargument.
C
Because,
in my judgment, the applicability of the prevention clause
was raised, and because there is neither unfairness to respondents
in putting forward the statutory interpretation that does
not bar their claim, nor unfairness to petitioners who sought
no leave to address the issue further, I turn to my own views
on the meaning of the prevention clause's terms.
III
Because
this Court has not previously faced a prevention clause claim,
the difficult question that arises on this first occasion
is whether to import the two conditions imposed on the deprivation
clause as limitations on the scope of the prevention clause
as well. If we do not, we will be construing the phrase "equal
protection of the laws" differently in neighboring provisions
of the same statute, and our interpretation will seemingly
be at odds with the "natural presumption that identical
words used in different parts of the same act [were] intended
to have the same meaning." Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers,
Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932). But the presumption
is defeasible, and in this instance giving the common phrase
an independent reading is exactly what ought to be done.
This
is so because the two conditions at issue almost certainly
run counter to the intention of Congress, and whatever may
have been the strength of this Court's reasons for construing
the deprivation clause to include them, those reasons have
no application to the prevention clause now before us. To
extend the conditions to shorten the prevention clause's reach
would, moreover, render that clause inoperative against a
conspiracy to which its terms in their plain [506
U.S. 263, 293] meaning clearly should apply, a conspiracy
whose perpetrators plan to overwhelm available law enforcement
officers, to the point of preventing them from providing a
class of victims attempting to exercise a liberty guaranteed
them by the Constitution with the police protection otherwise
extended to all persons going about their lawful business
on streets and private premises. Lest we embrace such an unintended
and untoward result, we are obliged to reject any limiting
constructions that stare decisis does not require.
A
The
amalgam of concepts reflected in 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) witness
the statute's evolution, as 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
from a bill that would have criminalized conspiracies "to
do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities
of any person . . .," Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.,
App. 206 (1871) (statement of Rep. Blair), quoting H.R. 320,
2, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871), to a statute including a civil
cause of action against conspirators and those who "go
in disguise" to violate certain constitutional guarantees.
See 17 Stat. 13. The amendment of the original bill that concerns
us occurred in the House, to calm fears that the statute's
breadth would extend it to cover a vast field of traditional
state jurisdiction, exceeding what some Members of Congress
took to he the scope of congressional power under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c)
in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. 402, 417
(1979). The principal curb placed on the statute's scope was
the requirement that actionable conspiracies (not otherwise
proscribed on the strength of their threats to voting rights,
see 1985(3)) be motivated by a purpose to deny equal protection
of the laws. The sponsor of the amendment, Representative
Shellabarger, put it this way: "The object of the amendment
is . . . to confine the authority of this law to the prevention
of deprivations which [506 U.S. 263, 294]
shall attack the equality of rights of American citizens.
. . ." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 478 (1871).
The
effect of the equal protection requirement in thus limiting
the deprivation clause has received the Court's careful attention,
first in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), then in
a series of more recent cases, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88 (1971), Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn.
v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979), and Carpenters v. Scott,
463 U.S. 825 (1983). For present purposes, Griffin and Carpenters
stand out.
B
The
Griffin Court sought to honor the restrictive intent of the
42d Congress by reading the "language requiring intent
to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities,"
Griffin, 403 U.S., at 102 (emphasis omitted), as demanding
proof of "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators'
action." Ibid. And while this treatment did, of course,
effectively narrow the scope of the clause, it did so probably
to the point of overkill, unsupported by any indication of
an understanding on the part of Congress that the animus to
deny equality of rights lying at the heart of an equal protection
violation as the legislation's sponsors understood it would
necessarily be an animus based on race or some like character.
See id., at 100; Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 188
(remarks of Rep. Willard); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 478 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).
While
the Congress did not explain its understanding of statutory
equal protection to any fine degree, I am not aware of (and
the Griffin Court did not address) any evidence that, in using
the phrase "equal protection" in a statute passed
only three years after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress intended that phrase to mean anything
different from what the identical language meant in the Amendment
itself. That is not to say, of course, that all Members of
Congress in 1871, or all jurists, would have [506
U.S. 263, 295] agreed on exactly what the phrase did mean,
and certainly it is true that the conceptual development of
equal protection could hardly have been outlined in advance
by the Members of the 42d Congress. But equally is it true
that we have no reason to suppose that they meant their statutory
equal protection provision to be read any more narrowly than
its obvious cognate in the Amendment. Griffin, however, gave
it just such a reading.
To
be sure, there is some resonance between Griffin's animus
requirement and those constitutional equal protection cases
that deal with classifications calling for strict or heightened
scrutiny, as when official discriminations employ such characteristics
as race, national origin, alienage, gender, or illegitimacy.
See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
440-441 (1985) (describing the jurisprudence).4
But these categories of distinctions based on race or on qualities
bearing a more or less close analogy to race do not by any
means exhaust the scope of constitutional equal protection.
All legislative classifications, whether or not they can be
described as having "some racial or perhaps otherwise
class-based invidiously discriminatory animus," are subject
to review under the Equal Protection Clause, which contains
no reference to race, and which has been understood to have
this comprehensive scope since at least the late 19th century.
See, e.g., Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170
U.S. 283, 293-294 (1898) (citing cases). A routine legislative
classification is, of course, subject only to deferential
scrutiny, passing constitutional muster if it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate governmental purpose. E.g.,
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, (describing
the test); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981).
[506 U.S. 263, 296] But the point is that
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection scrutiny is applied
to such classifications, and if the scope of "equal protection"
in the statute is to balance its constitutional counterpart,
the statute ought to cover discriminations that would be impermissible
under rational-basis scrutiny.
There
is, indeed, even some extratextual evidence of a positive
congressional intent to provide just such a statutory reach
beyond what Griffin would allow. Some of the legislative history
of 2 of the 1871 Act suggests that the omission of any reference
to race from the statutory text of equal protection was not
the result of inadvertence, and that Congress understood that
classifications infringing the statutory notion of equal protection
were not to be limited to those based on race or some closely
comparable personal quality. The most significant, and often
quoted, evidence came from Senator Edmunds, who managed the
bill on the Senate floor and remarked that if there were a
conspiracy against a person "because he was a Democrat,
if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or because he
was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter . . . then
this section could reach it." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess., at 567.5 These are not, of course,
all examples of discrimination based on any class comparable
to race, and the Senator's list counters any suggestion that
the subject matter of statutory equal protection was meant
to be so confined.6 [506 U.S. 263, 297]
C
Notwithstanding
the Griffin Court's decision to read the deprivation clause's
equal protection element as more restrictive than Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection, the Court recognized that in a
different respect the statute remained more expansive than
its constitutional counterpart, in being aimed at deprivations
of equal protection by purely private conspirators, 403 U.S.,
at 96-97. This very conclusion, in fact, prompted the further
concern that the deprivation clause might, by its terms, apply
to facts beyond Congress' constitutional reach. The Court
nonetheless obviated the need to address the scope of congressional
power at that time by confining itself to a holding that the
statute was constitutional at least insofar as it implemented
congressional power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment and
the right to travel freely, each of which was "assertable
against private as well as governmental interference."
Id., at 105.7
The
Court was then only one step away from putting the deprivation
clause in its present shape, a step it took in Carpenters.
Whereas Griffin had held that requiring a purpose to infringe
a federal constitutional right guaranteed against private
action was sufficient to allay any fear that the deprivation
clause was being applied with unconstitutional breadth, Carpenters
turned this sufficient condition into a necessity insofar
as conspiracies to deprive any person or class of persons
of federal constitutional rights were concerned, by holding
that, in the case of such a conspiracy, no cause of action
could be stated without alleging such an ultimate object of
depriving the plaintiff of a right protected [506
U.S. 263, 298] against private action by the Federal Constitution.
463 U.S., at 833.
It
was a most significant step. In going no further than to affirm
the deprivation clause's constitutionality insofar as it applied
to conspiracies to infringe federal constitutional rights
guaranteed against private action, the Griffin Court had arguably
acted with prudent reticence in avoiding a needless ruling
on Congress' power to outlaw conspiracies aimed at other rights.8
But in converting this indisputably constitutional object,
of giving relief against private conspiracies to violate federal
constitutional rights guaranteed against private action, into
the exclusive subject matter of the clause with respect to
conspiracies to deprive people of federal constitutional rights,
the Carpenters Court almost certainly narrowed that clause
from the scope Congress had intended. If indeed Congress had
meant to confine the statute that narrowly, its application
to federal constitutional deprivations in 1871 would not have
gone beyond violations of the Thirteenth Amendment, adopted
in 1865. (The next clear example of a constitutional guarantee
against individual action would not emerge until United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759-760, n. 17 (1966), recognizing
a right of interstate travel good against individuals as well
as governments.) But if Congress had meant to protect no federal
constitutional rights outside those protected by the Thirteenth
Amendment, it is hard to see why the drafters would not simply
have said so, just as in the third and fourth clauses of 1985(3),
they dealt expressly with infringements of voting rights,
already guaranteed against abridgment by the Fifteenth Amendment
adopted in 1870.
The
Carpenters Court might have responded to this objection by
suggesting that the textual breadth of the deprivation clause
reflects its applicability to conspiracies aimed at violating
rights guaranteed under state law or rights [506
U.S. 263, 299] guaranteed against individual infringement
by federal statutory law, since such possible applications
were left open by the Court's opinion. See Carpenters, supra,
at 833-834. But this answer would prompt the even more fundamental
objection that there is no textual basis in the deprivation
clause (or in the portions of subsection (3) common to all
clauses) suggesting that any such individual-infringement
limitation was intended at all.
Whether
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